During the period 1929-34 a campaign forcing the repatriation of Mexicans and Mexican Americans was carried out in the U.S. by states and local authorities. The claim of politicians at the time was that repatriations would reduce local unemployment and give jobs to Americans, alleviating the local effects of the Great Depression. This paper uses this episode to examine the consequences of Mexican repatriations on labor market outcomes of natives.
the substantial variation in the incidence of deportation of Mexicans relative to the local population across cities. It was due to both large differences in the local Mexican population relative to the total population in 1930 and differences in the intensity of repatriation across communities. The most intensive period of Mexican deportations and repatriations was 1929-34, but they continued until 1936-7 (Hoffman 1972 The simple correlation obtained from cross-sectional regressions, even with a vast array of controls, shows that larger repatriation of Mexicans was associated with lower employment of natives and higher unemployment of natives. These correlations, which are usually not statistically significant, may not capture causation. Cities that were most negatively affected by the Great Depression could have experienced voluntary Mexican repatriation as well as native employment decline. To alleviate this concern and make progress toward identification of causality, we follow two distinct methodological strategies. First, we construct a measure of city-level imputed repatriation, based on the national excess-repatriation of Mexicans relative to other migrants, by age groups.
We then use the share of Mexicans and their age distribution in 1930 across cities to predict the excess repatriation, independently of any city-specific economic conditions. Nationally, Mexicans were the only group targeted for repatriation and deportation.
We use this imputed repatriation rate as an instrument and, in addition to state fixed effects, we add a series of city-level controls shown to affect employment and wages in local economies (Boustan et al. 2010 , Fishback et al. 2005 ). These include the generosity of New Deal policies, weather variables, Bartik index, presence of police, the local sector composition and other characteristics in 1930. The instrumental variable (IV) analysis confirms the positive correlation between Mexican labor force decline and native employment decline, usually with low or marginal statistical significance.
Second, we apply a matching method and estimate the average effect of repatriations in a nonparametric and possibly more robust way, relying on weaker assumptions than the 2SLS estimates (Imbens 2015) . We define as "treated" those cities that experienced repatriation intensity greater than 2 (or 5)% of the population between 1930 and 1940, and we call "control" cities those where Mexican repatriation intensity was less than 1%. We then match each city with one in the opposite group, so as to minimize the distance of an array of pre-determined variables within the pair. Additionally, we also match cities with similar value of the estimated propensity score, or probability of being in the treatment group. We then estimate the effect of the treatment (repatriation of 2% or more) by calculating the average difference in labor market outcomes of natives between all paired treatment and control cities. The results are in line with the 2SLS analysis. In most specifications we find that high repatriation rates produced lower native employment growth and larger unemployment growth, though most of the coefficients are not statistically significant. Interestingly, if we focus on cities with very high repatriation rates (more than 5% of the initial population) this method produces a significant negative effect on native employment indicating that the local labor market disruption caused by high repatriation intensity may have been significant. While this period has some specificity, some of the lessons learned may also be applicable to the present. First, the campaign spanned six years and was expected to provide relief to native unemployment by freeing up jobs for natives to take, hence a decade is the appropriate time span to evaluate the consequences. Second, while the Great Depression occurred during this period, the years 1930 and 1940 were comparable in that GDP in each of those years was close to its long run trend, with a deep recession and a big recovery in between. Third, given the high unemployment rate of U.S. natives when Mexicans were repatriated, 3 the claim that their jobs could be taken by Americans seems at its strongest during this period. Hence our main focus is analyzing whether repatriation affected native labor market outcomes in the decade 1930-40. We can also investigate whether any impact persisted until 1950. The advantage of analyzing this episode is that we can learn the medium-and long-run effect of a large program of Mexican repatriation, obtaining a useful test of the claim that this practice is an effective way to increase native employment. We note with interest that the situation reversed after 1950. With the expansion of the Bracero program, some cities that had experienced a large repatriation began to have larger inflows of Mexicans.
Hence the repatriation intensity in the 1930s is a strong predictor of positive Mexican immigrant flows in the 1950s and later. It is therefore not reasonable to analyze Mexican repatriation impacts post-1950, as the negative impact of the repatriation on the local Mexican labor force was fully reversed by that time.
We explore additional outcomes and channels that may explain the negative local effect of repatriation on natives. We find that native workers had a tendency to downgrade their jobs in response to Mexican repatriations and that net migration of natives into the city also declined. Likely, the negative multiplier effect of losing labor and local demand may explain part of the employment and wage effect. We do not find any significant effect on employment of other immigrants. Our results also show that the stronger negative employment effects were on those jobs complementary to those taken by Mexicans (e.g., on more skilled and administrative jobs and crafts) as companies likely lost workers and had to cut other positions. Finally, the effect of higher unemployment rates 3 Especially during the peak repatriation years of 1932-4 the unemployment rate in the U.S. was higher than 20%. Rarely have researchers used repatriation of immigrants to analyze the reverse impact on natives. The importance of such analysis is multi-faceted. First, the impact of removing immigrants who are integrated into the labor force can be very different from, and not symmetric to, the impact of adding them. There are different costs of integrating and separating workers, each disrupting production, and they may work different ways.
Second, with several executive orders encouraging deportation of undocumented immigrants, the Trump administration is pursuing a repatriation policy with similar goals to those of the 1930s. Given the large economic and human costs of deportation-based policies, it is important to test whether there is any evidence suggestive of the promised labor market benefits to natives. have recently analyzed the effects of the repatriations following the end of the Bracero program, when almost half a million agricultural workers from Mexico were excluded from the U.S. agricultural labor market. The authors find no significant effects on employment and wages of U.S.-born agricultural workers. They argue that capital-intensive technology and crop adjustments played a key role in absorbing the labor change, hence not significantly affecting labor market outcomes for natives. Their study has the advantage of focusing on agricultural workers with the ability of analyzing certain specific channels of adjustment. However, such a specific policy may have limited external validity for the economy as a whole. The Bracero program and the subsequent repatriations affected mostly the agricultural sector, currently a very small fraction of U.S. labor markets. In contrast, the repatriations of the 1930s involved many urban communities with large cities, whose economies were already based on manufacturing and services. 4 Hence, we view our paper as complementary to, and extending the analysis of, .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the historical context and some details about the Mexican repatriation program. Section 3 describes the data we use to measure Mexican repatriations and the labor market outcomes. Section 4 outlines the empirical specification and our identification strategy. Section 5 discusses the interpretation framework of our findings. Section 6 shows the estimates and the robustness checks, while Section 7 concludes. (Hoffman 1972 ) for repatriation were that (i) "it was essential to reduce unemployment of citizens," and that (ii) "many of the target individuals were jobless and on relief " (i.e., receiving some form of public or charity assistance). The oft-repeated claim of a positive effect of repatriation on local unemployment was behind the involvement of local authorities and charities in the program. In the statements of most bureaucrats and politicians of the time, the positive effect of Mexican repatriation on native employment was simply self-evident. 6 Yet the repatriation program would eventually be criticized for violating civil liberties and personal freedom, and for having overall negative social consequences. Evaluating whether the underlying economic motivation was sound, seems therefore critical. Figure 1 , we show the map of the continental U.S., divided into population. Each city's marker sizes is proportional to its population. The first impression is that there is no significant correlation between repatriation and labor market outcomes of natives.
Historical Background
While there is large variation in employment growth across cities (most of it for cities with very low intensity of repatriation), the cities with large and very large repatriation rates (negative values on the horizontal axis) do not seem to perform very far from the average. Panel B of Figure 2 shows the same scatter plot, with changes in native unemployment 1930-40 as a share of working age population on the vertical axis and repatriation intensity on the horizontal. Even in this case the association is weak, but somewhat negative (see the regression line). This implies that cities with higher repatriation rates (large negative values) also had larger increases in the native unemployment rate between 1930 and 1940.
As can be seen from Figures 1 and 2 , the net flow of Mexicans in most U.S. economic areas and cities was negative during the 1930-40 period. The Great Depression of 1929-35 certainly induced 7 The 1930 and 1940 Censuses also identify State Economic Areas (SEAs), which encompass the whole U.S. territory, while cities only include the more densely populated localities. However, those units are only identified in the smaller samples (5% sample for 1930 and 1% sample for 1940) of the Census and do not allow precision of measurement of Mexican immigrant share. The measurement error on the share of Mexicans can be nontrivial also because, in some cases, the variable was missing and subsequently imputed by Ruggles et al. 2015 . Hence relying on the full census count is particularly important to minimize measurement error (see Aydemir and Borjas 2011) . Therefore, in the main analysis of the paper we focus on cities as geographic units. shows the repatriation rate relative to initial population for people over 40 years of age. Normally, return for economic reasons is prevalent among younger generations. Older migrants who, on average, have spent more years in the U.S. are less likely to leave. In fact, even in this period of economic depression the change in population of cohorts over 40 was positive for the European groups, implying inflows larger than repatriation, while it was negative for Mexicans, implying greater returns of older working-age people. These statistics reveal a particularly large tendency of Mexicans to repatriate when compared to other immigrant groups in this period. As Mexicans were the only immigrants targeted for repatriation we consider their "excess" return relative to European immigrants as a proxy for forced/encouraged repatriation. What percent this represents of the population depends largely on how large Mexican population was relative to the local population. Figure 3 shows the correlation between the Mexican population share in 1930 and the Mexican repatriation as a share of initial population. We notice a very strong and not far from linear relation in which an increase in the Mexican population as of 1930 by x% of total population was associated with an increase of about x/3% in the repatriation of Mexicans as a share of total population. Next, Table 1 lists the cities with the highest repatriation rates in 1930-40 relative to initial population. We list all cities with values larger than 2% in absolute value, which is the threshold to define a city as "treated" when we adopt a matching strategy for the analysis. A large share of "treated" areas was in Texas, but Arizona and California, New
Mexico and some localities in Indiana are also well-represented.
Note that we define Mexicans as Mexican-origin, including those born in Mexico and the children of Mexican parents, because the deportation program was conducted based on ethnicity-race rather than place of birth. This means that many of the repatriated people of Mexican-origin were U.S. citizens.
9 Accordingly, native-born workers are also defined as U.S.-born who are not children of Mexican-born parents. Other immigrants include only the first generation foreign-born without Mexican-origin.
Empirical Strategy

Instrumental Variable and Regression Approach
Our explanatory variable of interest is the repatriation of Mexicans between 1930 and 1940 relative to the population in 1930 for each U.S. city. We then relate this variable to the change of several labor market outcomes for native workers over the same time period. In order to achieve identification of the causal effect of repatriation, however, we need variation in repatriation that is uncorrelated with determinants of local labor market outcomes. Below we discuss our approach in this direction.
Formally, the repatriation intensity variable is defined as follows:
The The term P c,1930 is the total working age population in city c and year 1930 and we use it for standardization. Any effect of repatriation will depend on how large the decline in Mexicans was, relative to the local population. The decomposition on the right hand side of Equation (1) The second term,
, is the share of Mexicans in the population of working age in city c.
We begin our empirical analysis by showing the correlation between the repatriation variable in (1) and several labor market outcomes of natives across cities. However, a first order concern is that of identifying a source of variation for ∆M EX c P c,1930 which, after controlling for some observable city features, is uncorrelated with local determinants of labor market demand and economic performance between 1930 and 1940. In the decomposition above it is clear that the first term, capturing intensity of local repatriation of the Mexican community, is highly correlated with local 9 The fact that U.S. citizens were encouraged or coerced to repatriate was later considered as a grave civil right violation by states and local governments. In 2005, the State of California passed the "Apology Act for the 1930s Mexican Repatriation Program", apologizing for the state government's role in the repatriation.
10 Throughout our analysis, we restrict our sample to individuals aged 18 to 65 who were not self-employed, living in group quarters, or enrolled in school.
economic and labor market trends. Namely, the propensity of Mexicans (and any other group) to leave will be higher in cities more severely affected by the Great Depression. Moreover, on average, the Mexican repatriation rate can be correlated with repatriation rate of all immigrant groups, and hence be a very imprecise proxy for the specific "excess repatriation" of Mexicans that we would like to capture as explanatory variable. On the other hand, the share of Mexicans in the local working age population, M EX c,1930
, is at least pre-determined relative to the labor market outcomes of the 1930-40 period. While it is not purely random, and certainly correlated with other observable and unobservable city-characteristics as of 1930, it can be a good starting point to provide identifying variation since it is highly correlated with Mexican repatriation (as shown in Figure 3 ).
In our main instrumental variable strategy we exploit city variation of the share of Mexican individuals in the population and its age composition in 1930. We then apply a national repatriation rate of Mexicans net of the repatriation rate of Europeans, by age group, as this difference suggests an excess repatriation likely produced by the campaigns (as discussed in Section 2). At the same We call this IV "imputed repatriation rate" and we construct it as follows:
In (2) 
This second method simply uses differences in the share of Mexicans as identifying variation across cities.
The main equation that we estimate, first by OLS and then by 2SLS with the instruments described above, is the following:
The variable y in the 2SLS regressions can be interpreted as the effect on outcome y, for subgroup j, of a repatriation intensity of Mexicans equal to one percent of the working age population.
Matching
As an alternative to the 2SLS strategy we also implement two matching methods. Their main advantages are being more flexible and robust estimators, and not depending on the fully parametric assumptions about the effect of repatriation on native labor outcomes. Hence they will strengthen the credibility of our results and provide another estimate of the average effect of repatriation, using somewhat different identification assumptions. The core idea of matching methods consists in classifying cities as either treated or control units, and pairing each one of them with one or more similar cities in the opposite group (Imbens 2015) . In our setting we define "treatment" to be the experience of high Mexican repatriation intensity between 1930 and 1940, while "control" corresponds to the experience of a very low (near zero) level of Mexican repatriation. The identifying assumption is that, after conditioning on a set of covariates (or on the propensity score), the treatment assignment is random. In other words, the only systematic differences between matched cities, one in each group, is the share of Mexicans, which drives the differences in the repatriation rate. As mentioned above, we are able to condition on a rich set of labor market characteristics including pre-1930 employment and unemployment trends, a Bartik index, and demographic, industrial and human capital compositions as of 1930.
To be more specific, consider the potential outcomes framework where Y We implement two different estimators: nearest neighbor and propensity score matching. The first defines similarity among cities as a weighted function of a set of chosen variables. A city with the closest economic/demographic/labor market characteristics, but in the opposite group, will be matched to each treatment and each control. The method is non-parametric as it does not impose any explicit functional form for either the treatment assignment or the outcome. The second approach we use is matching the propensity score, which defines similarity based on estimated treatment probability. It requires estimating the probability of being in the treatment group in a first stage which is done parametrically, imposing a logit model. In the second step, this method matches each city with one in the opposite group but with a similar predicted value in the first stage.
The main parameter of interest when implementing this method is the average treatment effect (ATE). 12 Namely, this is the mean difference between the two potential outcomes (either observed
It is estimated via its sample analog
The estimates are then interpreted as the average effect of Mexican repatriation on natives' labor market outcomes. We show robust standard errors derived by Abadie and Imbens (2006 , 2011 ).
Framework to Interpret the Estimated Coefficients
Our main empirical approach focuses on the identification of the effect of repatriations on the change in employment of natives using a reduced-form approach. The estimates of this effect (captured by the coefficient β in the regression and the ATE in the matching method) can be interpreted within the framework of a classic labor demand and labor supply model. Their signs 12 A related parameter potentially of interest is the average treatment effect on the treated ATET, E[Y 1 − Y 0 |treated]. In our case, however, the number of treated cities is very small so this is a noisy and potentially unreliable parameter. 13 For notational simplicity we ignore denoting imputed outcomes. Technically, the treatment effect for the control group should be denotedŶ 1 − Y 0 and for the treatment it should be Y 1 −Ŷ 0 . and magnitudes will reveal important information on the total net effect from the different channels we discuss below.
The easiest way to interpret our estimated coefficients is to think of the repatriation of Mexicans as a decrease in the supply of the specific type of labor provided by that group. Mexicans have skills, occupational distribution and task employment that characterize them. Repatriating them will cause a decrease in the supply of those. As we are considering a decade of repatriations and its consequences we should think of these as medium-long run effects. It is reasonable to believe that over the decade the change in Mexican supply is accompanied with changes in capital. This, as a complementary factor, would leave locations with declines of Mexicans implying a decline in labor demand that accompanies the lower labor supply. However, if capital is significantly slower than labor in adjusting, there may be an increase in capital per worker and hence average wages would increase more where more Mexicans are repatriated. Therefore, a negative estimate of the coefficient β in equation (4) would be consistent with the idea that departures of Mexicans free up some capital per worker and natives' employment opportunity benefit. This is a "short run effect" emphasized in Borjas (2003) and it may still be present in the 10-year horizon only if capital is quite slow in adjusting.
A second relevant aspect in determining the sign of the β coefficient is the complementarity of Mexican and native workers in the production process. If their jobs and tasks are rather different (e.g., Mexicans are farm workers and natives are administrators, or Mexicans are laborers and natives are white collar) and complementary, (i.e., both are needed in production), then a decrease in Mexicans will also decrease the demand for native workers, implying a positive estimate of β. The sign of the average effect on natives (employment, unemployment and wages) coefficient will reveal the aggregate intensity of complementarity-competition-return to scale effect of Mexicans on all natives. A negative sign of β in the employment regression (or positive in the unemployment regression) implies that more repatriations increase the employment of natives and hence that, in net, the competition/decreasing return effects prevail: decreasing Mexican supply is beneficial to the aggregate demand/productivity of natives. To the contrary, a positive β in the employment regression (or negative in the unemployment regression) estimate implies that the complementar-ity/increasing return effects prevail and fewer Mexicans reduce the demand for native labor. A zero effect will imply that those two forces balance each other and a decrease in Mexican labor does not affect natives' productivity.
Before presenting the estimation results we provide a description of Mexican immigrants' labor market characteristics in comparison to natives'. Table 2 6 Implementation and Results
Instrumental Variables: Validity and First Stage
Our main identification strategy consists in implementing the 2SLS estimation outlined in Section 4.1. The main instrumental variable used is the one described in (2) . In robustness checks we also use the simpler version (3). In Table 3 we show the coefficients from the first-stage regression:
The coefficient θ, reported in the first row of the table, represents the effect of the imputed change in Mexicans (obtained as in Equation (2)) on the actual change in Mexicans as a share of the population in working age, which is the explanatory variable in our second-stage regression (4). The key identifying assumption when using these instruments is that the predetermined shares of Mexicans in each city by age group in 1930, after controlling for other variables and local characteristics, are independent of other unobservable factors varying across cities and affecting the labor market outcomes of natives. We provide some tests of the identifying assumption in Table 4 below.
First, let's review Table 3 In Column 4 we directly control for a set of local economic and demographic characteristics in 1930 that may be correlated with the concurrent presence of Mexican communities. They may also be correlated with the labor market performance across cities in the 1930-40 period. Specifically, we first include the share of agricultural and manufacturing workers in the local labor force. As described in Table 2 , Mexicans were highly concentrated in the agricultural sector. Moreover, manufacturing was a very important sector in this period, deeply affected by the Great Depression.
At the same time, we add city-level demographic variables including the share of non-whites in the population, and the share of young individuals (aged 18 to 40). As the Mexican repatriation was targeting ethnicity (sometimes defined as race) and the excess repatriation was higher for older people (Figure 3) , controlling for these variables should reduce the risk of spurious correlation. We also include the logarithm of total working age population as of 1930. As this variable is included as a means of standardization in both the explanatory variable and in the IV, it may create a spurious correlation (see Clemens and Hunt 2017). Even controlling for these local characteristics, our instruments strongly explain the actual repatriation with an F-statistic around 25. We include these variables in all subsequent columns.
In Column 5 we then address two additional important concerns. The first is the differential severity of the Great Depression across cities. As this period saw a major decline in economic activity in several specific industries, the sectoral composition of cities might explain a large part of the employment performance and could be correlated with the share of Mexicans. Hence we construct a Bartik index that predicts the employment growth of workers based on each city's industrial composition in 1930 and the national employment growth of that industry in the 1930-40 period. Namely the included control is:
where η ic is the share of total employment of city c in industry i as of 1930; ∆E i is the nationallevel change in the log of total employment in the same industry between 1930 and 1940. 15 The second concern is the differential intensity of local police. This may be a signal of local criminal activity. As a proxy, we include the share of policemen among the population, both measured in 1930. These two controls make a small difference for the estimated coefficient and its statistical significance.
In Column 6, we also control for the generosity of New Deal (log total grants received) and we include two variables to account for extreme weather: the Dust Bowl intensity and the sum of months with extreme wet or drought. Table 4 shows that there is no significant correlation between the Mexican communities in 1930
and pre-1930 trends of the outcome variables for native workers. Table 5 tests whether our imputed IV, constructed to predict the negative change in Mexican 15 We use sixteen broadly defined industries according to Census industrial code in 1950 (the variable "ind1950" in IPUMS). 16 The Dust Bowl was a period of severe dust storms in the 1930's caused by severe droughts and failure to apply dryland farming to prevent wind erosion. 
Regressions: Employment and Unemployment Outcomes
Before we present the Instrumental Variables regression results we show, in Table 6 Table 6 , of course, may be the affected by the fact that Mexicans were voluntarily leaving cities which were severely hit by the Great Depression. While many of the correlates with the severity of the Great Depression are included among controls, unobserved factors may be still lingering and produce spurious results. In order to estimate a coefficient which better captures the causality link from repatriation to native employment, we look at the instrumental variable results.
In Table 7 we show the 2SLS estimates of Equation (4) Table 6 . In Columns 7-11 we provide four additional results. First, as a robustness check, in Column 8 we use our alternative instrumental variable (∆ M EX C /P C ) Alt . That variable is simpler and based only on the variation of Mexican share across cities. In Column 9 we focus on occupations with a high share of Mexicans.
Among all the 3-digit occupations we choose the top 20 in terms of decline in employment due to Mexican repatriations. Those represent the subset of the labor market that should experience some reduction in competition from repatriation. Then, in Column 10, we restrict the outcome for the subgroup of natives aged 41-65. The Mexican repatriation resulted in a more intense decrease in this subgroup and hence the competition effect might be stronger and the complementarity effect weaker.
Panel A of Table 7 Table 8 below, to identify whether any broad occupational group was positively affected by repatriations and which broad groups were more (negatively) affected by the complementarity effect from Mexicans.
The bottom panel of Table 7 shows the 2SLS results for (changes in) native unemployment.
These results also confirm those from Table 6 in that most of the estimated coefficients are negative and some are significant. This implies that cities which experienced high Mexican repatriations also had higher native unemployment in the decade to follow. The medium-run coefficients range between -0.01 and -0.041 stating that an outflow of Mexicans equal to one percent of population was associated with an increase of native unemployment between 0.01 and 0.04 percent of the population. Notice that even in Column 9, where we consider those unemployed natives who were last employed in the top-20 Mexican occupations, the effect is negative. The evidence is that even in heavily Mexican occupations their departure was not easily replaced by native unemployed.
Possibly different location, specialization and task employment made replacement quite hard.
Our instrumental variable approach confirms that the OLS results are not hiding significant spurious correlations. In fact, we find that Mexican repatriation did not cause higher employment nor lower unemployment for natives. Overall, our results in Table 7 suggest that the policy did not accomplish the stated objectives by local and federal authorities. Moreover, the point estimates suggest actually detrimental labor market effects for U.S.-born natives, although often not statistically significant.
In Table 8 we break down the employment results by occupation types. Namely, we identify low-(Column 1), intermediate-(Column 2) and high-skill (Column 3) occupations. These three groups include, respectively, the bottom three, the intermediate three and the top four broad occupational groups shown in Table 2 . As shown in that table, Mexican workers specialized in the low-skill occupations, and about 70% of them were in the bottom three occupations (and mainly in Laborers and Farm Laborers). Hence, we expect the potential substitution effect to be strongest in the first column implying a null or negative coefficient while the second and third column should experience positive coefficients as complementary jobs may experience depressing effects from Mexican repatriations. The estimates in Column 1 are in fact small and not significant. Natives in low-skill occupations did not experience a reduction in employment (Column 1) as Mexicans left, but they did not benefit either from that. Considering broad occupational groups, therefore, we do not see much evidence that it was easy for natives to substitute for Mexicans, even in the jobs where they were most concentrated and even in a period of high unemployment. It could be that the location of jobs was different from where natives were, that the specialization in detailed tasks was different. In any case, there is no clear evidence of a labor market improvement for low skilled natives. Moreover evidence of a strong complementarity effect is present for medium and high-skill occupations (Columns 2 and 3) . The magnitude of the positive estimates in the last two columns reveals that the loss of Mexican jobs was associated with the loss of native jobs especially at intermediate and high levels of skills. This indicates that the employment effect on complementary occupations were much stronger than the competition effects in the "Laborer" and "Farm Laborer" occupations. The estimates of Table 8 imply that skilled natives lost jobs once Mexicans were repatriated, while less skilled natives did not necessarily replace them.
Other Outcomes
One possibility is that other immigrants, rather than natives, benefited from the repatriation of Mexicans in their employment outcomes. While during the 1930-40 decade there was essentially no positive immigration from other countries, immigrant communities might have moved from elsewhere in the U.S. to replace Mexicans in cities with large repatriation intensity. Table 2 shows that other immigrants were not as strongly concentrated among laborers as Mexicans, but rather were largely employed as craftsmen and operatives. One may still think that their employment was helped to a greater extent by repatriations if their skills were closer substitutes to those of Mexicans and if the local labor market conditions were improved by repatriation. In Table 9 we present the results using the change in employment of non-Mexican Foreign-born workers as a dependent variable and the six specifications of Table 6 . While the point estimates of these effects are usually negative, they are very small and never significant. The point estimates are between -0.018 and -0.04 and very far from statistical significance. While one can argue that other immigrants may not have been harmed in their employment opportunities by the repatriation of Mexicans, there is no evidence that they were helped.
We then analyze, in Table 10 , whether "occupational wages" of natives changed in response to the repatriation of Mexicans. Occupational wages are constructed by associating to an individual the average wage in her occupation in 1940 (there are no wage data for 1930). Hence the occupational wage in a city reflects the distribution of occupations and an increase in this wage implies that there has been a shift in the distribution toward better or worse paying occupations. By focusing on this variable for natives and on its change between 1930 and 1940, we capture whether natives had an occupational "upgrade" (positive change) or "downgrade" (negative change) during the decade. We have emphasized that the repatriation of Mexicans may have opened some jobs for laborers and farm workers but also eliminated jobs in sales, administrative and clerical positions. This type of job replacement at the bottom of the wage ladder and job destruction at the top should have implied an occupational downgrading of natives in cities where repatriations were more intense. Table 10 shows that the impact of Mexican repatriation on native occupational wages was also negative, although mostly non-significant, as cities with greater deportation (by one percent of population) saw a decline in natives' occupational wages (by 0.1-0.2 percent) although not statistically significant. Rather than providing better labor market options to natives, the repatriations worsened the occupational wages of natives.
What we have found so far suggests that locations with high repatriation intensity experienced labor market conditions for natives similar to, or somewhat worse than, those with no repatriations. This is far from the beneficial effects promised by the authorities. A final test of whether repatriation rates affected native workers is to analyze whether those rates were correlated with net internal migration of natives and faster growth of working age population of natives. Even a positive "perceived" (if not real) effect of those repatriations may have attracted natives to those cities, looking for the jobs vacated by Mexicans and supposedly available. Table 11 shows the impact of repatriation on native population in working age (Column 1) and on net internal migration of natives (Column 4). Both dependent variables show a positive and not significant coefficient, implying smaller immigration and smaller native population growth in cities with higher repatriation of Mexicans. Columns 2 and 3 seem to imply that cities with large Mexican repatriation had also more native churning, i.e. more native immigration and emigration. However the net of the two effects is small and positive, as shown in the last column.
Matching Results
If the effects of repatriation of Mexicans are not linear and if other omitted variables also impact non linearly labor market outcomes, then the 2SLS method can be mis-specified. As described above, we also use a more robust and non-parametric method to identify the causal effect of interest. In our main specification of the matching method, we define a city as treated if the repatriation rate is two percent of the initial labor force or larger, and as control if it is equal to one percent or less. There is an intermediate group of cities with repatriation values between one and two percent which are dropped from the sample as they did not experience a significant shock and are difficult to classify as strictly treated or control. This yields 14 treated cities and 527 control cities. We use the following matching variables: pre-trends for employment and unemployment rates of natives in the period 1910-30, Bartik index, labor force share in manufacturing, agriculture, young , and the non-white share of the population. These variables proxy labor market conditions and industrial structure across cities in our sample. In the main specification, we match each city with a single one in the opposite group (i.e., its nearest neighbor). The first stage in the propensity score analysis is estimated via logistic regression. to analyze whether these very strong claims had any validity, ex-post.
We find that cities with larger repatriation intensity, driven by a larger initial Mexican community, performed similarly or worse in terms of native employment and wages, relative to cities which were similar in most labor market characteristics but which experienced small repatriation intensity. This finding is robust across specifications, subsamples and estimation methods. Not only did politicians' claims not hold true, but the opposite seems closer to what happened in reality.
The repatriation of Mexicans, who were mostly laborers and farm workers, reduced demand for other jobs mainly held by natives, such as skilled craftsman and managerial, administrative and sales jobs. Moreover, the repatriation of Mexicans did not result in other immigrants gaining jobs.
Given the large amount of pain, disruption and suffering that this campaign caused to Mexicans and their families, it is crucial to notice that it did not deliver any of the labor market benefits promised to natives. In fact, our estimates suggest that it may have further increased their levels of unemployment and depressed their wages. 
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